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FOREWORD
Through incisive research and analysis, Leonard
Wong and Stephen J. Gerras show how rising disability
compensation rates reflect the emergence of a culture
that includes exploiting the permissive disability
process. Unfortunately, capitalizing on a permissive
disability system has the potential to threaten societal
trust in the military, jeopardize US Army readiness,
and encourage an entitlement culture that is eroding
the Army’s notions of selfless service—the very
foundation of the Army institution. Discussing the
unintended consequences of disability compensation
is a delicate endeavor because the essence of the
entitlement—taking care of our nation’s veterans—
must remain inviolable. Nevertheless, the military
profession must initiate a conversation concerning the
unintended effects of disability compensation.

CAROL V. EVANS
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
US Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
For 40 years, from 1960 to 1999, about 8 percent of the
veteran population received disability compensation.
In 2000 the percentage edged up to 9 percent or 2.3
million veterans. By 2018 the percentage had tripled
to 24 percent or 4.7 million veterans. Although many
researchers attribute this upward trend to the influx
of wounded from the Iraq War and the Afghanistan
War, the authors show that favorable legislative
action, Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) policy
changes, societal developments, and improved
information flow enabled and encouraged many
more veterans to file for disability. The rise in the
number
of
veterans
receiving
disability
compensation signaled a cultural transformation
concerning disability compensation that would
eventually spread throughout the US Army and
the other services.
The culture surrounding disability compensation
gained strength after the 9/11 attacks as it moved
from loosely connected groups of veterans to units
in the repetitively deployed Army reserve
components. Eventually, the culture developed in
active units as participants in the VA Benefits
Delivery at Discharge program and a surge of
retirees in the Department of Defense shared their
insights about the disability process with those
still in uniform. Underlying the situation is the
good-news story that more soldiers and veterans
have gained awareness of a valuable entitlement
and are understanding the process for obtaining
the entitlement. Today, nearly two-thirds of all
soldiers depart the Army with a disability rating.
Unfortunately, the data also point to less benign
implications for the military.
vii
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Many of today’s soldiers are exploiting a generous
veteran disability compensation system overextended
far beyond its original purposes. Three consequences
of this exploitation deserve the profession’s
attention. First, if the Army is viewed as complicit
in encouraging soldiers to capitalize on an overly
permissive entitlement, the trust between society and
the Army may be strained. Second, rising disability
rates may affect readiness should the substantial
lifelong annuity of disability compensation be added
to the total cost of bringing a soldier onto active duty.
Fortunately, these two consequences have yet to occur.
Unfortunately, the third consequence, which has
already materialized and is the authors’ main concern,
is today’s soldiers are reconceptualizing disability
compensation as something earned and subsequently
owed to them. Soldiers believe they are owed
disability compensation—not for a debilitating injury
or disease, but the hardships of service as a soldier.
Viewing disability compensation as recompense for
the sacrifices and selflessness demanded of soldiers
allows soldiers to rationalize the exploitation of
a permissive disability system. This unsettling
development is diluting the profession’s principle
of duty and undermining the Army’s concept of
selfless service.
The authors propose a two-pronged strategy to
address this situation. To reduce the likelihood of using
the hardships of service to rationalize capitalizing on a
lenient disability system, the Army must minimize any
needless sacrifices demanded of today’s soldiers. The
recently unveiled Army People Strategy is a step in the
right direction. Unfortunately, the financial gain from
an easily manipulated disability system will continue
to be alluring until the overall VA disability system is

viii

US Army War College

reevaluated and reformed. Because Congress, the VA,
and veterans service organizations all have an interest,
a voice, and a vote in any reform to the disability
system, the Army should request the formation of an
independent commission tasked with developing a
mutually agreed-upon solution that will address the
detrimental impact disability compensation is having
on the military profession. This call for reform is driven
not by fiscal considerations but by the desire for the
Army to remain both an esteemed institution trusted
by society and an honorable profession marked by
selfless service.
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VETERAN DISABILITY COMPENSATION
AND THE ARMY PROFESSION:
GOOD INTENTIONS GONE AWRY
Leonard Wong
Stephen J. Gerras
To care for him who shall have borne the battle and for
his widow, and his orphan.

—Abraham Lincoln, Veterans Affairs Motto

Our system incentivizes disability, when our system
should be incentivizing health and well-being.
—David Shulkin, former Veterans Affairs secretary

I just gotta get one more deployment so I can catch me
some of that PTSD disability. But not so much that they
take my guns away.

—Interviewed soldier

This monograph analyzes how the noble obligation
to care for our nation’s veterans, as espoused by
Abraham Lincoln and embraced by the Department
of Veterans Affairs (VA), devolved into a system that,
while rightfully aiding millions of veterans, is having
an unnoticed impact on the military profession.1
The monograph examines how the intersection of
well-intentioned policies, changes in societal and
organizational cultures, and soldiers acting as rational

1. Abraham Lincoln, “Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address”
(speech, The Capitol, Washington, DC, March 4, 1865), https://
www.nps.gov/linc/learn/historyculture/lincoln-second
-inaugural.htm; and Karen Jowers, “VA Chief: Time to Rethink
Disability System; Current Setup ‘Not Sustainable,’” Military
Times, June 23, 2017, https://www.militarytimes.com/veterans
/2017/06/23/va-chief-time-to-rethink-disability-system-currentsetup-not-sustainable/.

1

actors has set the stage for unanticipated—and yet
totally predictable—detrimental outcomes.2
Many of today’s soldiers are exploiting a
permissive veteran disability compensation system
overextended far beyond its original purposes. Three
subsequent consequences deserve the US Army
profession’s attention. First, if the Army is viewed
as complicit in encouraging soldiers to capitalize on
an overly permissive entitlement, the trust between
society and the Army may be strained. Second,
rising disability rates may affect readiness should the
substantial lifelong annuity of disability compensation
be added to the total cost of bringing a soldier onto
active duty. Fortunately, these two consequences have
yet to occur. The third consequence, however, has
already materialized and is our main concern. Today’s
soldiers are rationalizing disability compensation as
something earned and subsequently owed to them—
not for a debilitating injury or disease, but for the
hardships of service to the nation. This unsettling
development is diluting the profession’s principle
of duty, depleting the military’s moral capital, and
ultimately undermining the Army’s concept of service.
Interestingly, this study did not identify any
villains to be blamed. Our research did not uncover
evidence of outright fraud or treachery. In dozens of
interviews across the Army, we did not encounter any
instances of soldiers violating the law. Nevertheless,
our quantitative analysis reinforced by our
qualitative research reveals something has changed
in soldier attitudes and behavior concerning disability
compensation. A policy change that started off as a
2. Unless noted, quotations are from servicemembers
interviewed during the course of this study. Special thanks to
Colonel John Plunkett for inspiring this analysis.
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much-needed correction to an underused entitlement
for veterans has developed into a potent organizational
culture—a culture that encourages soldiers to exploit
a disability system to the point where two-thirds of
today’s soldiers receive disability compensation upon
departing the Army.
The intent of this study is to prompt the Army to act
before the culture surrounding disability compensation
becomes a permanent fixture and endangers the
health of the Army profession. Prompting the Army
to change the culture is precarious because in the
end, the essence of the entitlement—taking care of
veterans—must remain sacrosanct. In addition, the
vast majority of people involved in this study—from
the authors, to soldiers reading these pages, to senior
military decision makers—have a vested interest in
the topic. Veteran disability compensation, by most
measures, is the consummate “third rail.”
Undoubtedly, some readers will interpret this study
as an attack by callous liberals, stingy conservatives,
witless academics, or grumpy boomers oblivious
to the sacrifices of those who serve in our nation’s
defense. Nothing could be further from the truth. We
have spent careers in uniform and have seen up close
the harsh costs military service exacts from soldiers
and their families. We ourselves receive disability
compensation from the VA and believe no disabled
veteran should ever be left behind. But we have also
listened to the accounts of rank-and-file soldiers,
military and civilian health professionals, wounded
warriors, and senior leaders in the Army and VA.
We have witnessed the growing, pernicious impact
unchecked disability compensation is inflicting on the
ethos of the profession of arms. This observation as
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well as concern for our profession drive this research
and analysis.
A QUICK OVERVIEW
The VA disability compensation program is
intended to provide monthly, tax-free payments to
veterans with disabilities resulting from diseases
or injuries incurred or worsened during active
military service. Disabilities presumed to be related
to military service, even though they occur after
soldiers have departed the military, can also qualify
for compensation. Qualifying conditions include both
physical and mental disabilities. Additionally, no
statute of limitations restricts how long a veteran can
wait before submitting a claim for disability benefits.
The VA disability system rates each serviceconnected disability on a scale of 0 to 100 percent in
10 percent increments. A veteran with a 10 percent
rating receives a monthly check of $142. A 60 percent
rating qualifies the veteran for a $1,131 payment, and
a 100 percent rating leads to a monthly payment of
$3,106. Unlike many federal and private-sector benefit
programs, VA disability is unaffected by the income
level, employment status, ability to work, or age of the
veteran. Most payments continue for the duration of
a veteran’s life, though veteran disability ratings may
increase or decrease with VA reevaluations.
Although VA disability compensation is relevant
to the veterans and members of every service, we focus
on the US Army because it is the institution with which
we are most familiar and hold most dear. We began
our inquiry by obtaining Army personnel data sets
and VA disability files from the Defense Manpower
Data Center. Analyzing the merged data allowed us

4

to examine trends across time and subpopulations
within the Army.
To obtain the perspectives of the force, we
conducted interviews with soldiers—both officer
and enlisted—at Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Benning,
Georgia; Fort Lee, Virginia; Fort Leonard Wood,
Missouri; and Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Scores
of soldiers were interviewed in focus groups or
individual sessions lasting approximately 45 minutes.
Interviews were voluntary and confidential. Interview
audio was recorded, transcribed, and analyzed for
themes and trends. We also interviewed civilians and
retirees across the Army for their views on disability
compensation. Finally, we spoke with senior leaders
in the Army and the VA to gain their opinions and
policy insights.
HOW WE GOT HERE
The central theme of this monograph is the Army
is incurring unforeseen present and future costs to the
profession. Before delving into those costs, examining
how disability compensation began rising in the first
place is worthwhile. As shown in figure 1, we are in
the midst of a rapidly changing situation.3

3. Sarah K. Burns et al., Trends in VBA Disability
Compensation Spending, IDA Document NS D-5781 (Alexandria,
VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, June 2016), 3; and Veterans
Benefits Administration, Veterans Benefits Administration Annual
Benefits Report Fiscal Years 2000–2016 (Washington, DC: Veterans
Benefits Administration, 2001–17).
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Figure 1. Percentage of all veterans receiving
disability compensation
For 40 years, from 1960 to 1999—a time in the
nation’s history containing both war and peace—
the percentage of the veteran population receiving
disability compensation held steady at around 8
percent. In 2000 the percentage edged up to 9 percent,
or 2.3 million veterans. By 2018 the percentage had
climbed sharply to 24 percent or 4.7 million veterans.4
In addition to more veterans claiming disability, the
amount of disability claimed by each veteran also
increased. In 2000, beneficiaries had an average of
2.5 disability conditions and an average disability
rating of 33 percent. By 2017, beneficiaries were being
compensated for an average of 5.1 conditions and
4. Veterans Benefits Administration, Veterans Benefits
Administration Annual Benefits Report Fiscal Year 2018 (Washington,
DC: Veterans Benefits Administration, March 2019), 12.
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averaged a 51 percent disability rating.5 At first glance,
the influx of combat-wounded veterans from the Iraq
War and the Afghanistan War emerges as a logical
explanation for this trend. According to this reasoning,
because today’s wars are resulting in fewer soldiers
dying in combat, more are returning home wounded
and subsequently disabled.6 Although improved
survival rates have certainly influenced the number
of combat-wounded soldiers, closer analysis reveals
the reason the growth in disability rates was, and
continues to be, driven by more than just an increase
in casualties from the wars.
First, if an influx of casualties drives up disability
rates, one would expect a similar spike in disability
resulting from the casualties of the Vietnam War.
Instead, the percentage of veterans receiving disability
before, during, and after the Vietnam War remained
stable at 8 percent. Second, the percentage of veterans
claiming disability started rising months before the
9/11 attacks and years before the invasion of Iraq.
By the time the first bombs were dropped in the 2003
“shock and awe” campaign, disability levels were
already climbing. Third, the number of post-9/11
veterans receiving disability far exceeds the number
of wounded from the wars. About one-million Iraq

5. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Possible Higher
Spending Paths for Veterans’ Benefits (Washington, DC: CBO,
2018), 8.
6. For example, see Guy Raz and Marilynn Marchione,
“Disability Claims Rise among Veterans,” All Things Considered,
aired May 27, 2012, 3:00 PM ET, on National Public Radio,
https://www.npr.org/2012/05/27/153832767/disability
-claims-rise-among-veterans.
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or Afghanistan veterans receive VA disability.7 To
date, 53,000 soldiers have been wounded in combat
in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—a number
that accounts for less than 6 percent of all post-9/11
veterans receiving disability payments.8 Finally,
the most common conditions for which post-9/11
veterans receive disability include tinnitus, knee
problems, hearing loss, lower back strain, and limited
motion of an arm. These types of conditions led the
Congressional Budget Office to conclude, “rather than
arising from combat injuries, the higher disability
rates of the veterans who were deployed to Iraq or
Afghanistan appear to be related to environmental or
occupational factors.”9
If the current wars cannot completely account for
the growth in disability rates, then other factors must
be at work driving the dramatic change that began
in 2000 and continues today. Our analysis shows the
sharp increase in disability compensation originated
with the confluence of a series of seemingly unrelated
developments that created an increasingly permissive
environment for veteran disability. This environment
emanated from favorable veteran legislation, changing
societal attitudes, and improved information flow
to veterans.

7. National Center for Veterans Analysis and Statistics, “Key
Statistics by Veteran Status and Period of Service,” n.d., https://
www.va.gov/vetdata/docs/SpecialReports/KeyStats.pdf.
8. Office of the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs,
“Casualty Status,” news release, January 11, 2021, 10:00 a.m.
(EST), https://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf.
9. CBO, Veterans’ Disability Compensation: Trends and Policy
Options (Washington, DC: CBO, August 2014), 14.
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Legislation
In 2000 the context for veteran disability
compensation changed dramatically with the
passage of the Veterans’ Claims Assistance Act
(VCAA). Before the VCAA, the VA routinely rejected
disability claims because of insufficient supporting
documentation. With the VCAA, Congress specified
that the relationship between the VA and veterans
was to be nonadversarial in nature, and the VA’s
obligation was to assist veterans with the development
of their claims.10 Unlike most other federal agencies,
the VA was charged by Congress with a “duty to
assist” beneficiaries, rather than merely serving
as a gatekeeper to federal benefits.11 The VCAA
was significant because it set the stage for growth
in disability by redirecting the VA’s focus toward
assisting veterans in the claims process.
Also contributing to favorable conditions for
rising disability compensation were policy changes
concerning presumptive disability conditions—
disabilities presumed to be service-connected,
regardless whether the veteran is able to prove it.
Exposure to Agent Orange, an herbicide used in
Vietnam, is probably the best-known presumption. In
2001 the number of Vietnam veterans claiming type
2 diabetes was zero. Beginning in fiscal year 2002,
Congress passed legislation presuming type 2 diabetes
to be caused by Agent Orange. By 2003 over 135,000
Vietnam veterans were claiming diabetes. In 2005,
10. Terrence T. Griffin and Thomas D. Jones, “The Veterans
Claims Assistance Act of 2000: Ten Years Later,” Veterans Law
Review 3 (2011), https://www.bva.va.gov/docs/VLR_VOL3/6
-GriffinAndJones-VCAA-TenYearsLaterPages284-321.pdf.
11.

Griffin and Jones, “Veterans Claims Assistance Act.”

9

diabetes was the most widely compensated disability
among Vietnam veterans.12 To date, 14 presumptive
diseases, ranging from prostate cancer to Parkinson’s
disease, have been associated with Agent Orange.
Societal Changes
The increase in veterans filing for disability was
also encouraged by shifting societal attitudes toward
the military. Since the end of the Vietnam War,
when societal regard for the military reached its
nadir, America’s trust in the military has gradually
increased. The September 11, 2001, attacks and
subsequent wars, however, ratcheted public support
for the military up to new levels. For example, from
1985 to 2000, except for a brief spike after Operation
Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, about 65
percent of Americans said they were confident in the
military. Following the 9/11 attacks and the nation
going to war, the percentage of society expressing
confidence jumped up to the mid-70s.13 The goodwill
extended to the military subsequently spilled over
into public attitudes toward veterans. When a recent
poll asked how Americans would adjust the federal

12. Joshua D. Angrist, Stacey H. Chen, and Brigham R.
Frandsen, “Did Vietnam Veterans Get Sicker in the 1990s?
The Complicated Effects of Military Service on Self-Reported
Health” (working paper, no. 14781, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge, MA, March 2009), 6.
13. “Confidence in Institutions,” Gallup (website), updated
2020, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidenceinstitutions.aspx.
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budget for veterans’ benefits, an amazing 53 percent
of Americans said they would increase spending.14
Another facet of the environment that facilitated a
surge in VA disability rates was America’s changing
perception of mental health. As awareness of mental
health in American society increased in the 1990s and
early 2000s, the stigma associated with mental illness
lessened significantly. In 1999 the first White House
Conference on Mental Health was convened with the
stated goal of providing a “signal to our nation that
we must do whatever it takes not only to remove
the stigma from mental illness, but to begin treating
mental illness as the illness it is on a parity with
other illnesses.”15 Within the military, awareness of
mental illness—and, specifically, post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD)—was also growing. Surprisingly,
some of the first indicators came from the Vietnam
veteran cohort as disability claims for PTSD began
rising. In 2000 91,000 Vietnam veterans were receiving
disability for PTSD.16 Four years later, the number had
increased over 75 percent to 161,000.17
14. Paul Herrnson and Kathleen Weldon, “A Hero’s
Welcome: The American Public and Attitudes toward Veterans,”
HuffPost, updated December 6, 2017, https://www.huffpost
.com/entry/a-heros-welcome-the-ameri_b_6121898.
15. Hillary Clinton, “Remarks by the First Lady at the
White House Conference on Mental Health” (speech, Blackburn
Auditorium, Howard University, Washington, DC, June 7, 1999),
https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/EOP/First
_Lady/html/generalspeeches/1999/19990607.html.
16. Veterans Benefits Administration, Veterans Benefits
Administration Annual Benefits Report Fiscal Year 1999 (Washington,
DC: Veterans Benefits Administration, July 2000), 93.
17. Veterans Benefits Administration, Veterans Benefits
Administration Annual Benefits Report Fiscal Year 2004 (Washington,
DC: Veterans Benefits Administration, June 2005), 30.
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Societal perspectives toward disability in general
also changed. Influenced by the goals, rhetoric, and
tactics of the civil rights movement, the modern
disability rights movement brought about the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990—the world’s
first comprehensive declaration of equality for
people with disabilities. By 2000 the Americans with
Disabilities Act had made significant advances in
reducing the policy and physical barriers preventing
the integration of people with disabilities into
American society.18 More importantly, the Americans
with Disabilities Act led to the stigma associated
with disability being considerably reduced. Though
previous generations of veterans might have scoffed
at disability compensation because of the stigma of
being considered disabled, changing societal views
greatly reduced the reluctance of many veterans to file
for disability.
Finally, changing societal views that regarded
disability as broader than just the inability to work also
influenced the environment surrounding veterans.
These evolving societal perspectives expanded the
concept of disability to include a diminished quality of
life or a decline in the range of activities most people
enjoy.19 Although VA disability compensation, by law,
is intended to be based “upon the average impairments
18. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Enforcing
the ADA: Looking Back on a Decade of Progress (Washington, DC:
Department of Justice, July 2000).
19. For example, see World Health Organization,
International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health: Short
Version (Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2001);
and E. Brandt and A. M. Pope, ed., Enabling America: Assessing
the Role of Rehabilitation Science and Engineering (Washington, DC:
National Academies Press, 1997).
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of earning capacity,” actual practice gradually aligned
with changing societal perspectives.20 Thus, a 2007
Institute of Medicine study pointed out the VA and
Congress were implicitly pushing a much broader
view of disability by recognizing disabilities that had
“little if any effect on ability to work.”21 A more relaxed
definition of disability made disability compensation a
potential entitlement for a much larger proportion of
the veteran population.
Information Flow
Despite a supportive Congress, a more cooperative
VA, and an increasingly benevolent society, veteran
knowledge of disability benefits and the claims
process remained limited in the early 1990s. Mailings,
phone calls, and an occasional trip to the closest
regional VA office could only do so much in helping
a veteran get the proper documents into their claims
file. Three key developments in information flow
significantly increased the information, assistance,
and support veterans received: transition assistance
programs, veteran service officers (VSOs), and the
World Wide Web.
When the Cold War ended, America was eager to
reap the economic peace dividend by shrinking the
military. Memories of the painful downsizing after
the Vietnam War prompted policies to minimize the
detrimental effects of a drawdown. One such policy
was the establishment in 1990 of the Army Career
20. Authority for Schedule for Rating Disabilities, 38 U.S.C.
§ 1155 (2010).
21. Institute of Medicine, A 21st Century System for
Evaluating Veterans for Disability Benefits (Washington, DC:
National Academies Press, 2007), 88.
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and Alumni Program—later renamed the Transition
Assistance Program—which provided guidance and
help to soldiers transitioning into the civilian sector.
Though previous generations of soldiers had left the
Army with little more than a handshake and a train
ticket home, the newly formed transition assistance
programs eased the soldier’s burden of becoming a
civilian during the mandated reductions. In 1991 five
sites were established across the Army that provided
separating soldiers transition assistance, including
a class on VA benefits. By 1998 the program had
expanded to 45 locations, allowing thousands of
departing soldiers to be introduced to VA disability
compensation.22 The establishment of transition
assistance programs provided a platform through
which information on disability compensation could
be explained, discussed, and distributed to thousands
of soon-to-be veterans.
Although transition assistance programs raised
awareness of available VA benefits, the complex
process of filing a disability compensation claim was
still an obstacle for many veterans. The difficulty
of filing a claim was not a recent problem. After
the Civil War, Congress chartered veterans service
organizations to assist veterans struggling to assemble
their claims files. Veterans service organizations
provided their credentials to Congress and, in return,

22. “Transition Assistance Program History,” US Army Fort
Knox (website), updated August 2, 2019, https://home.army
.mil/knox/index.php/about/Garrison/directorate-human
-resources/adjutant-general/transition-assistance-program
/history.
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Congress provided tax exemptions.23 This unique
concept of outsourcing VA assistance eventually
evolved into trained and accredited VSOs from
recognized veteran organizations assisting veterans
with their claims and appeals before the VA—all at
no cost. In the early 2000s VSOs began to be assigned
to military bases, where they were easily accessed
by soldiers passing through the newly established
transition assistance programs. The VSOs became
the embodiment of the VA’s duty to assist: experts
eagerly helping veterans to understand the benefits
to which they were entitled and to navigate their
claim through the VA wickets. Not surprisingly, one
veterans service organization recently reported its
27-year decline in membership was finally halted
after its VSOs had secured a record $8.3 billion in
disability compensation.24
Finally, the introduction of the World Wide Web
brought the disability process into the information
age. Although the web was established in 1991, vast
amounts of information were not available to be
retrieved by average Internet users until the late
1990s and early 2000s. For the VA, the web brought
transparency and access to information essential to
the claims process. Crucial references, such as the
disability benefits questionnaires specifying exactly
23. “Training for VSO Lesson One: The Relationship
between the VA and Veteran Service Officers,” VA (website),
n.d., https://www.ebenefits.va.gov/sep/ecms-proxy/document
/sep/dynamic-content/sep/assets/downloads/Chapter_1_VA
_and_VSO_Relationship.pdf.
24. “VFW Snaps 27 Year Membership Decline,” Veterans
of Foreign Wars (website), July 16, 2019, https://www.vfw
.org/media-and-events/latest-releases/archives/2019/7
/vfw-snaps-27-year-membership-decline.
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what physicians would look for during an exam and
the VA Schedule for Rating Disabilities listing the
criteria used in determining disability rating levels,
became available to veterans, VSOs, and disability
attorneys. (Citing abuse of the system, the VA recently
removed the disability benefits questionnaires from
public view.)25 With Facebook debuting in 2004, VA
disability compensation forums emerged that afforded
veterans an almost limitless network for eliciting
advice, voicing complaints, and sharing experiences.
In 2001 12.2 percent of veterans reported using the VA
website to gather information.26 By 2010 68.8 percent
of veterans expressed willingness to use the Internet
to obtain information about VA benefits. Of the post9/11 veterans, 93.2 percent said the Internet was their
gateway for VA information.27
The coalescence of favorable legislation, societal
changes, and increased information led to a
rectification of the disability rate. The sharp rise in
disability compensation was remarkable considering
the veteran population was, for the most part, a loosely
connected community of individuals, each of whom
was tasked with retrospectively proving a disabling
injury or disease was service-connected. One could
hypothesize a more tightly coupled, highly organized
25. See Jim Absher, “VA Removes Disability Benefits
Questionnaires from Public View,” Military.com, April 3,
2020, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/04/03/va
-removes-disability-benefits-questionnaires-publicview.html.
26. VA, 2001 National Survey of Veterans (NSV) Final Report
(Washington, DC: VA, 2001), 1–7.
27. Westat, National Survey of Veterans, Active Duty Service
Members, Demobilized National Guard and Reserve Members, Family
Members, and Surviving Spouses (Rockville, MD: Westat, October
18, 2010), 75.
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population with the ability to proactively prove
a connection to service would push the disability
claim rate even higher. The post-9/11 use of the
Army reserve components (RCs) provided a natural
experiment for examining this proposition.
A PREVIEW OF THINGS TO COME
The Army’s RCs—the Army National Guard
(ARNG) and US Army Reserve (USAR)—were
mobilized for active duty at unprecedented rates with
the commencement of the global war on terrorism.
Interestingly, when RC soldiers demobilize from an
active-duty deployment, they are eligible to file for
disability compensation. Thus, repetitive deployments
of reserve units presented multiple opportunities
for RC soldiers to be evaluated for disabilities.
Additionally, RC soldiers receive disability
compensation payments while still serving in the
RC; they do not have to separate from the military—
although payments are suspended for drill days or
time spent on active duty. As a result, the post-9/11
RC deployments provide a time-compressed preview
of what happens when soldiers still in uniform can
proactively prepare for the disability claim process.
Beyond the individual level, the RC deployments
also shed light on the impact of organizational
culture. Culture, in an organizational context, is
“what ‘has worked’ in the experience of a society
that [is] worth transmitting to future generations.”28
Not surprisingly, disability compensation became
embedded into the organizational cultures of many
RC units as it was informally examined, analyzed, and
28. Harry C. Triandis, “Individualism-Collectivism and
Personality,” Journal of Personality 69, no. 6 (December 2001): 908.
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discussed. Interviews with RC soldiers revealed that
units determined what worked in getting disability
ratings and passed this information along to unit
members. For example, an ARNG soldier described
how disability compensation became part of the unit’s
deployment process:
When you come back from a deployment and you go back
to the armory, your leadership—everybody across the
chain of command—is saying, “Go get your VA physical!”
You’re entitled to one because you’re switching from
Title 10 to Title 32. You’re getting a DD-214 [Certificate
of Discharge].

A USAR soldier related how proactively creating
a paper trail to prove the service-connectedness of a
condition became a routine part of mobilization:
I know that every time we hit [demobilization], there was
someone there telling us we must ensure that if we have
something like halitosis [foot stomp], or jock itch [foot
stomp], or fungal infection [foot stomp], we needed to
document it. I went through [demobilization] three times
and this happened each time.

One ARNG soldier recounted how the prospect of
receiving disability was passed along from soldier to
soldier in his unit:
They pick up [disability compensation] from the
[noncommissioned officer (NCO)] next to them in
formation or from their uncle. Because the majority of the
people who are in the National Guard, just like the Army,
come from someone who was in the National Guard. In
fraternity terms, there are a lot of legacies. And they’re
talking about it.
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For the veteran community, a progressively
favorable environment combined with a muchimproved information flow encouraged an upsurge
in disability compensation. For mobilized RC units,
the effects of organizational culture were added to the
mix, and the result was sharp growth in RC disability
compensation rates, as shown in figures 2 and 3.29

Figure 2. Percentage of serving ARNG soldiers
receiving disability compensation

29. Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 were created with active-duty
transaction files, Reserve Common Components Personnel
Data System files, VA compensation files, and VA pension files
provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.
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Figure 3. Percentage of serving USAR soldiers
receiving disability compensation
The RC experience provided a natural experiment
for observing the impact of organizational learning
and culture on the disability compensation process.
This experiment revealed that units were quick to
develop informal norms and processes concerning
disability that were passed on to organizational
members. Analyzing the data to a deeper level finds
that the culture appears to have engulfed all ranks. For
example, from 2001 to 2015, the percentage of ARNG
officers receiving disability in the ranks of major to
colonel jumped from 3 percent to 19 percent. For the
same ranks in the USAR, the percentage jumped from
7.8 percent to almost 25 percent.
The RC experience also provides insights into
the shifting of disability compensation from a
retrospective to a proactive process. For the veteran
population, disability claims were submitted after
separating from the military. The degree to which a

20

disability was connected to service was established by
paging through years of medical records, searching
for proof of a key event, or verifying past exposure
to hazardous materials. For the RC population, each
deployment presented an opportunity for soldiers
to insert confirmatory evidence of the serviceconnectedness of a disability condition into their
medical records before submitting a disability claim.
Unfortunately, with the ability to prepare for a
claim, the potent organizational culture surrounding
disability sometimes led to undesirable motivations
and outcomes. As one ARNG soldier related:
My first [demobilization] was for guarding Washington,
DC, with air defense assets after 9/11. We got DD-214s,
and a bunch of guys filed for VA disability for sitting in a
building in DC. They got it for sleep apnea.

Another RC soldier sarcastically described how
a PTSD diagnosis was often a cure-all for the stress
of deploying:
You had a tough time because of “combat.” You didn’t
have all that mental and emotional stress because your
wife left you, is with somebody else, and spent all your
money. No, you’re traumatized by guarding the [dining
facility] and some rounds came in 800 yards away.

A USAR soldier serving alongside reservists with
civilian jobs at the VA recounted some advice passed
around their unit:
Take someone who has bad knees as a banker. They may
be trying to get some VA disability for that, and it was
common for the VA docs or administrators assigned to
my unit to advise them: “You know, for the military, you
have to do a [physical training] test, but for your civilian
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job, you don’t. So just say that you hurt your knees
training for your military service.”

BRINGING THE CULTURE TO THE ACTIVE
FORCE
Despite the steep increase in disability
compensation for both the veteran community and
the RC, for the average active-duty soldier in the early
2000s, disability compensation was simply not a subject
of casual conversation. For most active-duty soldiers,
disability compensation was a distant abstraction
applicable to veterans—not soldiers still in uniform.
This situation changed with several developments that
helped import disability compensation cultural norms
into the active-duty Army. One mode of transmission
resulted from the repeated use of the RC, as described
above. With deployed RC soldiers working alongside
active-duty soldiers in motor pools, military hospitals,
and forward operating bases throughout the world,
active-duty soldiers were presented a rare opportunity
to discuss disability compensation with someone who
had recently experienced—possibly repeatedly—the
entire disability process.
Another entry point into the active force for
the organizational culture surrounding disability
compensation emerged with the establishment of
Warrior Transition Units (WTUs). In response to the
deplorable conditions revealed by the 2007 Walter
Reed Army Medical Center scandal, the Army
established WTUs to provide comprehensive health
care for injured soldiers as they transitioned either
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to civilian life or back to military duty.30 In addition
to health care assistance, WTU soldiers also received
counsel on legal and financial matters—including VA
disability compensation. Over 72,000 soldiers have
passed through WTUs since their inception, with
over 40 percent returning to duty in the Army.31 The
soldiers returning to duty bring back to their units
both facts gleaned from VA briefings and insights from
watching 60 percent of their WTU peers navigate the
disability process. One officer described some of the
informal advice about the VA exam heard in the WTU:
There were some extremely educated privates and
specialists going through the system, and I was like,
“Wow, maybe I could learn something from them.” I can
recall a specialist telling me how after you get dressed
when the provider is still with you, be sure to sit down
to put your pants and your footgear back on. Because if
you stand up, your provider—even if he’s writing things
down—he’s looking at you. So if you’re bending down to
put your shoes on and if you just told him this is as far as
you can go, he’s going to get you.

Although informal contact with RC soldiers
and the dispersion of WTU soldiers throughout the
active Army helped raise awareness of disability
compensation, the effects were mostly localized
throughout the Army. A more instrumental means
30. Dana Priest and Anne Hull, “Soldiers Face Neglect and
Frustration at Army’s Top Medical Facility,” Washington Post,
February 18, 2007, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive
/politics/2007/02/18/soldiers-face-neglect-frustration
-at-armys-top-medical-facilityc0c4b3e4-fb22-4df6-9ac9
-c602d41c5bda/.
31. “Warrior Transition Units Fact Sheet,” US Army Warrior
Care and Transition program (website), November 2016, https://
wct.army.mil/documents/factsheets/WTU_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
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of embedding the topic of disability compensation
into Army culture was the establishment of the VA
Benefits Delivery at Discharge (BDD) program. The
BDD program, introduced in 1995 and significantly
expanded in 1998, was a predischarge program for
soldiers leaving the military within 60 to 180 days.
The BDD program streamlined the disability process
by combining the military separation physical and the
VA disabilities assessment into a single exam.
The BDD program was important because it
was intended to allow soldiers to undergo medical
examinations and file for disability before leaving
the military. Before the BDD program, veterans
would have to negotiate the disability claims process
after separating from the military—often away from
military medical facilities as well as friends and peers.
With the introduction of the BDD program, soldiers
in transition assistance programs could participate in
the VA disability process while on active duty and
thus establish service-connectedness for potential
disabilities in the remaining months they were in
uniform. Although some critics claimed the BDD
program was underused—by 2008, claims under the
BDD program still constituted less than 5 percent of
the annual claims received by the VA—the significant
impact of the BDD program was the opportunity for
participants to pass on their disability compensation
knowledge, experiences, and advice to soldiers back
in the barracks.32
Although the BDD program was fielded to
reduce the processing time for disability claims, an
32. Examination of the US Department of Veterans Affairs
Benefits Delivery at Discharge and Quick Start Programs, 111th Cong.
(2010) (statement of Gerald Manar, Deputy Director, National
Veterans Service).
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unanticipated consequence was the emergence of
disability compensation as a subject of interest to
serving soldiers. One interviewed soldier, when
asked how she knew so much about the disability
compensation process, commented, “You get most of
your information from people who have already been
through it.” Another soldier provided more specifics:
It’s usually the people that are getting out. . . . Soldiers
who are transitioning, they already went through the
process and are like, “Okay, well, you know, this is
worth this much and this is worth this much. So go get it
documented. That way, when it’s time for you to get out,
you can get this much as well.”

Another soldier described how participants in
the BDD program were often eager to share their VA
disability experiences:
So what happens is a soldier comes back and they say,
“I just got my VA ratings!” They want to brag about it.
“Well, that means I’m getting $2,300 a month for the rest
of my life!” Boom! What did you do to get that?!?

A senior NCO spoke of the information he
was given:
Just in this last year, in the last 12 months, I’ve had three
of my best friends retire, and every one of them has
said, “Dude, this is what I did when I went through the
VA process.”

A junior soldier explained:
I’ve heard others speak of, “Oh, if you do this, or say
this, you can get certain percentages for this and that.”
And I’m hearing this from people already in the process.
They’re not necessarily speaking to me. They’re speaking
to each other, other NCOs, or leadership.
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The BDD program was significant because it
opened the eyes of a large proportion of the active
force to the world of disability benefits. For decades
disability compensation had been an entitlement
addressed after separating from the military. With
the BDD program sending out soldiers eager to share
about the profitable value of a disability rating and
what was needed to qualify for it, soldiers still in
uniform began considering disability compensation as
part of their total compensation package. Although the
average young soldier probably cannot comprehend
that a 10 percent disability rating is worth over a halfmillion dollars (assuming a 23-year-old soldier, a
75-year lifespan, and a 6 percent return on investment),
he or she almost certainly can appreciate the value of
receiving a monthly check for the rest of his or her life.
As foreshadowed by the RC experience, the allure of
potential financial gain began leading many soldiers to
be proactive in their approach toward disability. As a
result, disability compensation gradually shifted from
being the VA’s retrospective examination of a soldier’s
time in service to a future windfall which soldiers—as
rational actors armed with passed-on knowledge—
could influence during their time in uniform.
Another development that significantly facilitated
the embedding of disability compensation into
the culture of the active Army was a change in the
federal law addressing military retirees. From 1964
to 2001, to avoid a revolving door in the civil service
hiring process, a law was enforced requiring military
retirees to wait 180 days after leaving the military
before starting a civilian job with the Department of
Defense (DoD). After the September 11, 2001 attacks,
a national emergency was declared, and the law was
waived. As a result, thousands of retirees were hired
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by the DoD. From 2001 to 2014 more than 41,000
military retirees started jobs as DoD civilians.33 This
deluge of recently retired servicemembers brought
maturity, expertise, and continuity into the force, but
the influx also delivered a cohort of veterans eager
to share with active-duty soldiers their recent VA
disability experiences. One particularly influential
subpopulation of the military retiree cohort is retired
senior NCOs.
Retired senior NCOs working as DoD civilians
have a special role in bringing awareness of disability
compensation into the active force because they have
the respect and trust of soldiers. These NCOs have
accumulated a considerable amount of knowledge
and experience, so their advice and counsel hold
more weight than that of barracks lawyers, transition
assistance briefers, or VA brochures. These NCOs
have an enduring affection for soldiers, so sharing
their experience with the disability process, from
their perspective, is just another way of taking care
of soldiers. As one retired senior NCO in a civilian
position commented: “It’s a bond. We stick by each
other. We take care of each other. We help each
other. We’re a family.” He went on to describe his
interactions with soldiers:
On any given day, I probably talk to anywhere from
10 to 30 people a day about disability. Just informal
conversations. . . . Let’s say a young sergeant calls. We
talk [business], and then I put my first sergeant hat on.
We get to talking about the future, when they [will]
decide to retire or get out, and the importance of getting
33. US Merit Systems Protection Board, Veteran Hiring in the
Civil Service: Practices and Perceptions: Report to the President and the
Congress of the United States (Washington, DC: US Merit Systems
Protection Board, August 2014), 46–47.
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everything medically documented. For success as a
soldier and success as a civilian, they need to make sure
everything lines up.

With their new experience as civilians, retired
senior NCOs now understand life after the military
and how retirement or separation—especially for the
enlisted ranks—is not as easy as people think. For
many retired senior NCOS, disability compensation
helps take the financial sting out of retirement for
today’s soldiers:
When we get out, we get kicked in the side and get our
$1,900-a-month retirement checks. How can I make it a
little easier for them? It’s already tough enough to get a
job. All these companies say how much they want to hire
vets, but when you get out, they want you to start off at
$10 an hour. You’re making way more money than that as
a first sergeant or sergeant major.

With the active force being influenced by soldiers
in the BDD program; senior NCOs working as DoD
civilians; and, to a lesser degree, interactions with RC
and WTU soldiers, the attitudes of active-duty soldiers
toward disability compensation began to change.
THE CULTURE OF DISABILITY
COMPENSATION
Not surprisingly, interviews revealed an uneven
distribution of the unwritten norms and rules in the
culture surrounding disability compensation. Firstterm soldiers years away from separating from the
Army give little thought to life beyond the Army, let
alone receiving veterans’ benefits. Nevertheless, many
junior soldiers reported being advised to “document
everything”—although the rationale for doing so was
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not always understood. In the words of one young
soldier: “As we go into our careers, we’re always told
if you go to the doctor, make sure you get it recorded.
But nobody ever says why.”
Eventually, soldiers take in the culture around
them and discover that documenting everything is the
first step toward receiving disability compensation. A
junior soldier described the moment he realized why
disability was a popular topic:
You start to go to retirement ceremonies and stuff like
that, and you hear, “I’m getting out with 100 percent
disability.” You start to piece things together. You look
into why is everyone saying these things, and you realize
that with disability comes money. Then you start to think,
“OK, maybe I have a disability. And if I have a disability,
then I want to get paid for it too.”

In the quest to document every medical issue
in case it could someday become a disability, one
particular process—sick call—has been pushed by the
culture into an outsized role. Previous generations of
soldiers have used sick call for two reasons: seeking
medical treatment for disease or injury or obtaining
official excusal from duties. Today sick call has
moved beyond attending to the sick, lame, or lazy,
and is now a critical first step for soldiers to get any
and all ailments entered into their medical records.
One soldier described the advice he heard concerning
sick call:
It’s like, “Go to sick call, document everything. Put
everything on paper. Anything that’s wrong with you,
put it on a piece of paper.” It’s just kind of a thing that
goes around. It’s word of mouth; it travels quick [sic].
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A senior NCO who is now a Department of the
Army civilian described the counsel he gives to
soldiers concerning sick call:
My theory now that I’m on the other side of retired is,
“Hey, go get seen [at sick call]. Go get checked out. Get
everything documented. But go get it documented and
then get back to your job.”

With the VA disability benefits questionnaires
available online, savvy soldiers could look up exactly
what needed to be communicated during a sickcall visit to support a future disability claim. For
example, one soldier described what to say at sick call
about migraine headaches: “Just Google it. See what
the symptoms are and say you have them. You can
actually look up how many headaches a month you
need for each level of disability.”
Of course, as sick call is used increasingly to
establish service-connectedness for a potential
disability, the risk of overloading the medical system
increases. As one NCO pointed out:
I have to continuously go to sick call for the same issue or
problem because they see so many people that come in [for
disability documentation]. . . . They think you’re faking.
After you come six or seven times, then they finally think,
“Maybe this guy is serious about being hurt.”

One disability condition commonly addressed
in the culture is sleep apnea—probably because a
prescription for a continuous positive airway pressure
(CPAP) machine brings a 50 percent disability rating.
Consequently, sleep apnea provides an illustrative
example of the proactive nature of the disability
compensation culture. One soldier described the
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detailed steps given to him to secure a future disability
rating for sleep apnea:
You go to your [primary care manager]. You tell them,
“I’m having sleep issues; I’m up every night.” They’ll
probably try to give you some sleep meds. You come
back and tell them, “This is not working for me.” If you’re
going to [Embedded Behavioral Health], you go in there
and you say, “Okay, I’m still having problems sleeping.
Now it’s interfering with my day-to-day schedule. Like,
I can’t focus, I’m falling asleep behind the wheel, or I’m
falling asleep at work. Every chance I get, I go to sleep.”

After establishing a documented history, soldiers
are advised to seek a referral for a sleep study. Advice
received for preparing for a sleep study ranged from
“Eat a big meal—like, a big, greasy meal from Burger
King” to “Stay up the day before; when your body is
so exhausted, you automatically snore . . . 50 percent!”
One soldier reported receiving this straightforward
guidance: “So when you go to the briefing before you
get your sleep study, they’ll tell you all the things
NOT to do. DO IT. Plain and simple.”
As soldiers near the end of their enlistment or
careers, their attention to disability compensation
understandably increases. A soldier’s focus gradually
shifts from establishing service-connectedness by
documenting all medical issues to understanding the
disability process to maximize the soldier’s disability
rating. In interviews across the force, soldiers spoke of
being advised the disability system can be manipulated
by using the right vocabulary and demonstrating the
right physical limitations. One NCO was told, “These
VA docs that see you—it’s all about wording and
flexibility.” Thus, one soldier reported he was advised
to use specific examples of the activities of daily living
during the VA medical exams:
31

When the doctor says, “Hey, I see you’ve got a little bit
of pain in your knee,” you need to say you have “great
difficulty climbing stairs.” You have “excessive pain in
the morning.”

Active-duty soldiers reported being coached,
but they seldom said they were told to lie outright
during the VA disability process. One medical
officer explained:
I have never witnessed anybody overtly committing
fraud. There’s just a lot of stuff done with a wink and a
nod. It’s like, “Let’s just see if we can get a little more
icing on the cake. If you use this verbiage, you’ll probably
see your disability increase.”

Advice to use the right buzzwords to cue a
particular disability rating is often accompanied
by counsel on how to approach the VA medical
examination. One frequently heard piece of advice
is to prepare for the exam by “making it your worst
day.” One soldier said: “Some of the best advice I got
was do a four-mile ruck march before you go in for
your VA appointment. Go in there in pain.”
As for the actual exam, soldiers were often
counseled: “Anyone can fool the range of motion.
You might be feeling like this, but show them this.” A
soldier described the specific guidance he received:
When you go in and do the [range-of-motion] test, the
doc will ask you to put your hands on your shoulders.
Put your hands up, squint your eyes, and say, “Aaagh,
can’t get there!”

In the veteran community, external factors
such as presumptive conditions, changing societal
attitudes, and increased information flow set the
stage for individual veterans to begin filing for more

32

disability. In the RC, repetitively deployed units
developed strong organizational cultures that added
to the upward trend. In the active Army, attention to
disability compensation was not limited to individuals,
as in the case of the veteran population, or deployed
units, as in the case of the RC. Instead, disability
compensation became a topic that spread across the
entire force. The result was the emergence of an Armywide organizational culture and a subsequent surge in
disability compensation for the active Army.
Figure 4 shows the sharp rise in disability ratings
for soldiers—both enlisted and officers—separating
(not retiring) from the active Army. Several startling
observations emerge. In 1998 12 percent of soldiers
received disability compensation. By 2017 the
percentage of soldiers receiving disability payments
had skyrocketed to 62 percent. In 1998 only 2 percent
of soldiers received a disability rating of 50 percent or
higher. By 2017 a whopping 51 percent were awarded
a disability rating of 50 percent or higher. Figure 4 is
a graphic illustration of the strength of the disability
compensation culture that continues to influence
disability rates, even as deployments decrease.
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Figure 4. Percentage of soldiers separating (not
retiring) from the active Army and
receiving disability
Interviews throughout the Army provided
evidence of differences in the distribution of the
disability compensation culture across military
specialties. Some believed soldiers in administrative
and medical specialties were more likely to file
for disability because they were more adept with
bureaucratic processes in general and more familiar
with the disability system in particular. As one
interviewed soldier stated: “You see [disability
claims] a lot from the smarter, more astute soldiers.
It’s typically really bright people that are willing to go
through the trouble to run the wickets.”
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Interestingly, some believed soldiers in the combat
arms were less likely to file for disability because of
the stigma of seeking medical treatment. One combat
arms NCO stated simply, “We’re brainwashed and
stereotyped that if you’re injured and go on sick call,
you’re a turd.” An infantry NCO provided more detail
on how differences between the combat arms and the
“soft-skill” military occupational specialties (MOSs)
can explain the situation:
I’m not trying to offend anybody, but medical treatment
is pushed more for the soft-skill MOSs. For the combat
arms side of the house, it’s mission, deployment, training.
Mission, deployment, training. You’re constantly
pushing, and if you are labeled as a medical issue, it’ll
affect your career. The combat arms are more broken, but
the soft-skill MOSs are more documented.

A sergeant major in a “soft-skill” MOS described
the situation from the other perspective:
I come from a medical command. And being in a medical
command, they most definitely make sure you go on sick
call, even to the point where they will escort you. I have
never not gone on sick call.

Ordinarily, one would expect soldiers in combat
arms specialties—branches characterized by a physical
and rigorous lifestyle—to have higher disability rates.
To explore the perception soldiers in administrative
and medical specialties have higher disability rates
because of their savvy and soldiers in the combat arms
have suppressed rates because of the stigma of medical
treatment, disability ratings were compared for
retired enlisted soldiers in each branch. Data analysis
supports the perspectives heard in the interviews.
Figure 5 groups the branches into the categories of
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combat arms, combat support, and combat service
support and illustrates the counterintuitive trend of
noncombat arms soldiers receiving the same (or more)
disability compensation as combat arms soldiers.

Figure 5. Percentage of retired enlisted soldiers
receiving over 50 percent disability by
type of branch
For example, in 1998, 32 percent of infantry soldiers
retired with a 50 percent or greater disability rating.
In the same year, 30 percent of adjutant general corps
and 37 percent of medical corps soldiers retired with
a 50 percent or greater disability rating. By 2014, 76
percent of retiring infantry soldiers were receiving at
least 50 percent disability. For soldiers in the adjutant
general corps and medical corps, the percentages had
increased to 76 percent and 84 percent, respectively.
This trend is also reflected in the RCs, where 11 percent
of soldiers in the predominantly combat arms ARNG
are receiving disability compensation, compared to
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15 percent of soldiers in the mostly “soft-skill” USAR.
Though one could hypothesize soldiers in combat
support and combat service support roles would have
higher disability rates because they are more prone
to injury, the evidence leans more toward a stronger
disability culture in the noncombat arms specialties.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CULTURE OF
DISABILITY
In the previous pages, we presented evidence of a
quiet cultural transformation occurring in America’s
armed forces. This transformation started in the
veteran community with legislative action, VA policy
changes, and societal developments enabling and
encouraging veterans to file for disability. Repeatedly
mobilized RCs then demonstrated how the disability
culture could gain strength as it moved from loosely
connected groups of veterans to organized units
of soldiers. Eventually, the culture emerged in
active formations as savvy participants in the BDD
program and a surge of retirees in the Department
of Defense shared their insights with those still in
uniform. Underlying the resulting growth in disability
compensation is the good-news story that more
soldiers and veterans are gaining awareness of a
valuable entitlement and understanding the process
for obtaining the entitlement. Unfortunately, the data
also point to less benign implications for the military
at three levels of analysis.
The Institution
At the institutional level, society’s confidence
in the military as an ethical profession is imperiled
by the military’s inaction toward rising disability
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compensation. From squad leaders to senior decision
makers, leaders at all ranks are aware of the permissive
environment encouraging soldiers to exploit the
disability system. For example, during his tenure from
2015 to 2017, former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter
observed a disability culture being cultivated in the
military’s transition assistance programs. He noted:
I found that these programs basically consisted of
short tutorials about how to go on welfare, qualify for
unemployment payments, and maximize the number of
“disability points” they scored to earn the most benefits
from the Veterans Administration. I thought this didn’t
serve the institution or the service members well at all.34

Interestingly,
Carter
groups
disability
compensation with another entitlement: veteran
unemployment
compensation.
Like
disability
compensation, spending on veteran unemployment
compensation increased dramatically as payments
jumped from $230 million in 2000 to over $600
million in 2006. Unemployment claims continued
to rise sharply through the Great Recession and, by
2011, unemployment compensation for veterans was
costing the government an astonishing $1 billion a
year.35 Because each military service reimburses the
Department of Labor for veteran unemployment, the
Army’s bill for unemployment had risen from $83
million in 2000 to over $515 million in 2011. Confronted
with an unsustainable cost and the growing perception
34. Ashton Carter, Inside the Five-Sided Box: Lessons from a
Lifetime of Leadership in the Pentagon (New York: Penguin Random
House, 2019), 408.
35. CBO, Transitioning from the Military to the Civilian
Workforce: The Role of Unemployment Compensation for
Ex-Servicemembers (Washington, DC: CBO, May 2017), 3.
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of unemployment compensation as an earned benefit
(for example, in 2013, 59 percent of all eligible soldiers
applied for unemployment), the Army recognized the
criticality of reducing unemployment claims.36
To address the situation, the Army partnered
with the Department of Labor, the VA, the Small
Business Administration, various corporations, and
veterans service organizations to provide job training
and employment to departing soldiers. Transition
assistance programs were revamped, remodeled, and
revitalized to better prepare and persuade soldiers
to pursue employment instead of applying for
unemployment benefits. By fiscal year 2018 the cost to
the Army had dropped to a remarkable $98.5 million.37
Although low unemployment rates and fewer soldiers
on active duty certainly contributed to the cost
savings, the noteworthy takeaway is that the Army
acknowledged skyrocketing unemployment claims
were a problem, and action was taken to remedy
the situation.
In stark contrast to the impressive efforts to rein
in unemployment claims, Army initiatives to counter
soaring disability compensation rates have been
largely absent. Of course, a key difference between
unemployment and disability compensation is that the
latter is paid by the VA, not the services. Financially
36. “Career Program Helps Cut Soldier Unemployment,”
NCO Journal, January 31, 2017, https://www.armyupress.army
.mil/Journals/NCO-Journal/Archives/2017/January/Career
-program-helps-cut-Soldier-unemployment/; and Susan Payne
Carter and Brian J. Miller, Analysis of Army Veteran Unemployment
Benefits and Transition Assistance (Washington, DC: The National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2015), 1.
37. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
Military Personnel Programs (M-1) (Washington, DC: Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense [Comptroller], March 2019), 4.
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speaking, the rapid rise in disability compensation
has incurred zero cost to the Army, and is therefore
the VA’s budget and business. Eventually, however,
the American people will question why the cost of
disability compensation now exceeds the annual
budgets of the Department of State, the Department of
the Interior, the Department of Labor, the Department
of Transportation, and the Department of Commerce
combined. Institutional inaction concerning disability
compensation has the potential to rattle society’s
perception of the military as an ethical profession.
The Organization
At the organizational level, rising disability
compensation may affect future Army readiness as
personnel costs are drastically underestimated. The
main elements of military personnel costs currently
include pay and benefits paid during military service
and retirement and health care benefits paid to
qualified personnel after leaving the military. In 1984
a law was enacted requiring each service to fund
its military retirement benefit liability by placing
funds into an accrual account for future financial
commitments. Forcing the services to use accrual
accounting was intended to improve manpower
management by including a measure of future
costs—in this case, military retirement—alongside
current personnel costs when considering force
structure decisions.38

38. CBO, “Accrual Accounting for Military Retirement:
Alternative Approaches” (working paper, CBO, Washington,
DC, July 1983), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/98th
-congress-1983-1984/reports/doc10-entire_1.pdf.
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The federal accrual account for future military
commitments is $1.6 trillion when military retirement
costs are included, but this amount does not take
into account the long-term liability of VA disability
compensation.39 Because disability compensation is
paid as a mandatory appropriation from the General
Fund of the Department of the Treasury, the military
services are not required to set aside any of their
budgets for future disability payments. Given the
average annual VA disability payment to a post-9/11
veteran has grown to $17,972, an accrual account
including disability compensation would require
nearly $3 trillion more from the services.40 For a
personnel-centric service such as the Army in which
manpower costs make up the preponderance of the
budget, the omission of VA disability from the accrual
account masks the true cost of bringing a soldier
into the Army.
Should the disability compensation liability be
included in the accrual account, budget analysts may
be tempted to reevaluate the Army’s current force
structure—especially with the growing federal budget
deficit and the emerging fiscal impacts of battling
a pandemic. Such budgetary pressure may lead to
adjustments to the Army’s congressionally authorized
end strength by either shifting the workforce mix to
more civilians or contractors or eliminating positions
altogether. The result would be a threat to the Army’s
39. CBO, Accounting for Federal Retirement and Veterans’
Benefits: Cash and Accrual Measures (Washington, DC: CBO,
September 2019), 18.
40. Veterans Benefits Administration, Veterans Benefits
Administration Annual Benefits Report Fiscal Year 2018 (Washington,
DC: Veterans Benefits Administration, 2019), 86; and CBO,
Accounting for Federal Retirement, 18.
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ability to respond to existing and future threats in the
increasingly uncertain global security environment.
The Profession
The institutional and organizational consequences
of diminished societal trust and reduced Army
readiness share two characteristics. First, both are only
potential implications. Nothing has indicated societal
trust in the military is currently waning or plans are
being formulated to include disability compensation
liability in the Army’s accrual account. Second,
both implications could be avoided with additional
funding. If through divine intervention the nation
experienced a series of budget surpluses and federal
coffers were filled to overflowing, concern over
the cost of disability compensation and the Army’s
reluctance to address it would probably dissipate.
The impact of the current disability system at the
level of the profession, however, is already occurring
and cannot be averted with more resources. Aspects of
the culture surrounding disability compensation are
eroding the values upon which the Army profession
is based. In The Masks of War, Carl Builder’s classic
journey into the personalities of each of the military
services, Builder writes:
What do the services revere most as a principle or cherish
as an ideal? How do the services differ in the altars at
which they choose to worship? . . . Altars worshiped are
revealing about how the worshipers see themselves and
their values.41

41. Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1989), 18.
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Tradition, according to Builder, is the altar at
which the Navy worships, and technology is the altar
at which the Air Force worships. But for the Army,
he states:
Of all the military services, the Army is the most loyal
servant and progeny of this nation, of its institutions
and people. If the Army worships at an altar, the object
worshiped is the country; and the means of worship
are service.42

The well-intended disability compensation
program has engendered a culture of entitlement that
is incompatible with the Army’s value of service—the
very foundation, as Builder suggests, of the Army
profession. The Army encourages this culture by
naively expecting soldiers to refrain from exploiting a
system in which sleep apnea gains a higher disability
rating than a below-the-knee amputation, a soldier
can claim as many medical conditions or file as
many appeals as he or she chooses, and briefers in
transition assistance programs and leaders in the
chain of command subtly encourage soldiers to exploit
the system.
As with most organizational cultures, the culture
surrounding disability compensation is unwritten,
intangible, and difficult to assess. Interviews with
soldiers of all ranks, however, revealed that the allure
of disability compensation is palpable and pervasive,
especially for soldiers nearing separation from the
Army. As one senior officer commented, “There is a
culture of ‘I better get it all before I get out.’” A senior
NCO described the culture this way:

42.

Builder, Masks of War, 20.
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It’s as if someone said there’s free stuff on the shelves
of the commissary for whoever wants it. And you rush
to the commissary to get your stuff because you don’t
know if the shelves will be empty when you get there or
if they’re getting ready to close the doors.

Taking advantage of an opportunity to grab
“free stuff,” however, contradicts how most soldiers
view themselves. This sentiment is antithetical to
the lofty notions of honor and virtue that soldiers
embrace the day they first put on the uniform. To
assuage their consciences of the conflict between the
ideal of integrity and the ease of gaming the system,
many of today’s soldiers are reconceptualizing
disability compensation.
This new conceptualization of disability
compensation goes far beyond the original intent
of making up for civilian earnings lost because of a
service-connected disability. The conceptualization
moves past the view of compensation for a future
limited by a diminished quality of life or the inability
to enjoy everyday activities. Instead, this new view
looks to disability compensation as an equitable
payment for the trials and tribulations endured while
serving as a soldier.
With disability compensation increasingly viewed
as reimbursement for the demanding life of a soldier,
any soldier can feel justified in claiming disability. As
one soldier explained:
We deal with so much crap being in the military day
in, day out. . . . Like me, personally, I’ve missed my
daughter’s first steps. Missed her first birthday. I’ve
missed so much stuff being in the military—I want all that
time back. Compensate me for something . . . I deserve it.

A junior soldier provided this perspective:

44

Of course good people are gaming the system. It’s
because this is how we look at it—I busted my ass for
this. I’ve been hard on my body. I’ve gone to a whole lot
of deployments. For me to get out of the Army and not
get anything is wrong.

Viewing disability as payment for the demands of
service is an especially attractive rationalization when
few are perceived to have accepted the call to serve.
As one interviewed soldier opined, “Service gives you
a certain entitlement based on the fact that 99 or 97
percent of the population won’t do it.”
Using service as a rationale for taking advantage of
a permissive disability system is intuitively appealing
to soldiers—especially soon-to-be retirees. In the
words of one almost-retired NCO: “It’s good. It’s
kinda like payback after 22 years.” A senior officer
offered these words to describe the situation: “When
you lease a car, you pay for the wear and tear that you
put on the vehicle over a period of time. I’ve served
for three decades, so now it’s time to get paid for that
wear and tear.”
Ironically, though many senior officers and NCOs
may feel vindicated in capitalizing on a lax disability
system, the idea of extending the disability entitlement
to less senior soldiers is not always welcome. One
senior NCO stated:
I would almost say it’s justified in the older guys. They’ve
been around; they’ve put in the time. The youngsters
are just looking for a paycheck. . . . I feel I’m entitled to
something because I’ve put in so much. These kids that
come in—they haven’t deployed. They haven’t done
anything crazy—combat, out-of-the-country stuff. I’m
like, “You have a nine-to-five job and you expect to be
paid for the rest of your life for that?” It’s because they
feel entitled!
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Rationalizing the decision to exploit the disability
system is grounded in a basic truth: Life in the Army
is hard. Two decades of war have created an Army in
which everything—including families and personal
aspirations—is subordinated to the mission. But life
in the Army is also hard because although the Army
may be effective, it is seldom efficient. Nearly every
soldier can recount frustration with “hurry up and
wait” and exasperation with pointless directives
emanating from every level of bureaucracy, ranging
from battalion to the Department of the Army. Thus,
one is not surprised when a soldier asks: “If you got
screwed over, wouldn’t you try to get what you can
get while the getting’s good? It makes sense. It sounds
bad, but it’s reality.”
For some soldiers, disability compensation makes
up for the opportunity costs of being a soldier. As one
soldier related:
For the enlisted population, what opportunities do we
have to get a better education? It leads to spitefulness, a
disgruntled employee—an employee that has no other
option to have some sort of security [like disability
compensation].

One soldier described the thought process of
justifying disability as payment for the hardships
of service:
Most people get into the service and they want to do
the right thing. But at some point, you can have some
negative things happen. It can create a negative attitude
where you feel like you’re entitled to more than what
you are getting, and you get frustrated with what you’ve
got. So, you feel justified in going after something that’s
a little bit sketchy.
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This feeling of being justified led a senior officer to
offer this reflection:
I wonder if the disability payment becomes a surrogate
for the Army demonstrating to me that it valued my
sacrifice and my family’s sacrifice over the last 17 years of
war. And I deserve this disability because you [screwed]
with me and my family.

Service and the Army Profession
In 1977 sociologist Charles Moskos introduced the
institutional/occupational thesis that cautioned the
fledgling all-volunteer military about taking on more
of the characteristics of an occupation rather than those
of an institution. According to the thesis, an institution
is “legitimated in terms of values and norms, that
is, a purpose transcending individual self-interest
in favor of a presumed higher good.”43 Members
of an institution (or profession) view themselves as
following a calling, and words such as duty, honor,
and country describe their motivation to serve. An
occupation, on the other hand, is legitimated in terms
of the marketplace. Pay, compensation, and monetary
inducements describe much of the motivation in
an occupation.
Of course, Moskos’s thesis was not that the military
was moving from being an institution to becoming an
occupation in a literal sense. Instead, his concern was
that the all-volunteer military must pay particular
attention to its motivations for service. In his words:
43. Charles C. Moskos, “Institutional and Occupational
Trends in Armed Forces,” in The Military: More Than Just a Job?,
ed. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Wood (Washington, DC:
Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988), 16.
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Is motivation rational or subjective, oriented toward
moral concerns of altruism, strongly affected, perhaps, by
internal emotional concerns, or is it efficient and rational,
concerned primarily with objective calculations?44

Moskos argued that the military profession rests
upon a foundation of service that emanates principally
from intrinsic motivations. Although soldiers certainly
can be motivated externally—by salary, bonuses, or
compensation—the health of the Army profession
relies mainly on internal motivations.
Interestingly, the potency of internal motivations
can be influenced by the introduction of external
motivations. In their development of cognitive
evaluation theory, prominent psychologists Edward
Deci and Richard Ryan found that “strategies that
focus primarily on the use of extrinsic rewards do,
indeed, run a serious risk of diminishing rather
than promoting intrinsic motivation.”45 Applying
this insight to the military profession, George
Mastroianni proposed the Army is able to encourage
an institutional culture based on superordinate
values and beliefs because most soldiers do not have
an extrinsic motivator to potentially explain their
commitment to military service. He explained:
Military service as a calling that transcends selfinterest is an especially compelling explanation
when behavior and self-interest may appear quite
dissonant. . . . Military service entails sacrifice: [W]hy
do we make those sacrifices? If incentives are offered to
serve . . . the transcendent component of motivation to
44.

Moskos, “Institutional and Occupational Trends,” 25.

45. Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner, and Richard M.
Ryan, “A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining
the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation,”
Psychological Bulletin 125, no. 6 (1999): 659.
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serve may be less necessary as a way of understanding
and explaining one’s behavior.46

Thus, as soldiers increasingly view disability
compensation as payment for the hardships of service,
more intrinsic forms of motivation—such as duty,
sacrifice, and selflessness—run the risk of being
demeaned and devalued. The result is a subtle shift
from an institutional orientation to an occupational
orientation to the detriment of the Army profession.
THE WAY AHEAD
Previous studies analyzing disability compensation
have decried its $76 billion annual price tag and the toll
on the federal deficit or warned of the perverse ability
of disability compensation to incentivize veterans to
remain sick and out of the workforce.47 This study
focuses on the impact of disability compensation
on the Army profession. We argued that the trust
between American society and its military may be
threatened if the Army continues to look the other way
while soldiers capitalize on an extremely permissive
disability system. We pointed out that future Army
readiness may be jeopardized by underestimating the
marginal cost of each soldier. And we argued that the
disability system is already increasingly prompting
soldiers to redefine disability compensation as an
46. George R. Mastroianni, “Occupations, Cultures, and
Leadership in the Army and Air Force,” Parameters 35, no. 4
(2005): 82.
47. CBO, Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2019 to 2028
(Washington, DC: CBO, December 2018); and David H. Autor et
al., “The Impact of Disability Benefits on Labor Supply: Evidence
from the VA’s Disability Compensation Program,” American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics 8, no. 3 (2016): 31–68.
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entitlement expected in exchange for enduring the
hardships of military service.
The Army finds itself in a difficult situation.
Soldiers with disabilities must be cared for and
compensated, yet over half of all soldiers departing
the Army are now leaving with a disability rating
of 50 percent or greater. The Army’s professional
ethos is being eroded by rational-actor soldiers
taking advantage of a disability system that many
have found to be easily manipulated. The initial
step in addressing this situation is for Army senior
leaders to acknowledge that the culture surrounding
VA disability compensation is indeed resulting in
inadvertent detrimental consequences. Policy makers
must recognize that disability compensation, though
well-meaning and benevolent, has unintentionally
engendered behaviors and attitudes that contradict
the profession’s values.
Because many soldiers use the hardships of
service to rationalize gaming the disability system,
Army policy makers should identify the aspects of
soldiers’ lives that can be altered to eliminate needless
stress and aggravation. Sacrifice and selflessness
are essential to the Army profession, but many of
the sacrifices demanded of today’s soldiers emanate
from an engrained organizational attitude that a
soldier is a free good. A free good is a resource that
is not perceived as scarce and is therefore believed to
be available without limit. Viewing soldiers as free
goods makes their time and their family relationships
expendable. Thus, a two-hour wait to be seen at a
medical treatment facility becomes routine; approval
of a leave request is held hostage to verification
of unrelated administrative data, current weapon
qualifications, and up-to-date dental readiness; and
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the impact on families of frequent moves, repetitive
deployments, and a frenetic pace of life can go
unnoticed. Fortunately, the Army unveiled The Army
People Strategy in October 2019: an effort to shift Army
priorities after decades of emphasizing readiness at
the expense of soldier and family well-being.48 In a
document signed by the secretary of the Army, chief of
staff of the Army, and sergeant major of the Army, the
intent of The Army People Strategy is described as such:
The Army invested significant resources and leadership
into restoring readiness and modernizing our Army.
However, our readiness focus resulted in an unsustainable
operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and placed significant
demands on units, leaders, and Soldiers and Families
and stress on the force. Therefore, we are prioritizing
People as the #1 Army priority. We will strive to reduce
OPTEMPO, adjust policies to prioritize People, and
reduce requirements to provide leaders additional time
to invest in their People.49

If the intent of The Army People Strategy can be
accomplished and the Army transforms to a more
people-centric organization, unnecessary sacrifices
will hopefully be minimized, and their appeal as
justification for exploiting the permissive disability
system will lessen. Unfortunately, managing a millionperson Army will always result in some bureaucratic
annoyances. More importantly, the financial gain
from an easily manipulated disability system will
continue to be alluring until the VA disability
system is reevaluated and reformed. Of course, the
48. Department of the Army, The Army People Strategy
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2019).
49. “Action Plan to Prioritize People and Teams,” US
Army (website), October 13, 2020, https://www.army.mil
/article/239837/action_plan_to_prioritize_people_and_teams.
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VA disability system is much larger than the Army
and even the entire uniformed military. Congress,
the VA, and veterans service organizations all have
an interest, a voice, and a vote in any reform to the
disability system.
The solution to this predicament will require the
Army to perform an act that all professions are hesitant
to perform: looking to outside assistance. Disability
compensation will continue to spiral upwards unless
the Army—and the other services—request Congress,
the VA, and veterans service organizations to form an
independent commission tasked with developing a
mutually agreed-upon solution that will address the
detrimental impact that disability compensation is
having on the military profession. The solution will
require all parties to compromise on a plan that will
seemingly benefit no one in the near term, and yet
assuredly benefit all in the future.
Though the primary task of the independent
commission will be to reevaluate the structure and
processes of the disability system, true reform will only
come with an examination of some of the weightier
issues involved with disability compensation. For
example, the independent commission should
consider questions such as the following:
• What is the purpose of VA disability compensation?
If the purpose is no longer to make up for the
average impairments of earning capacity, then a
new purpose must be defined, and that purpose
should circumscribe the system.
• How is VA disability compensation affecting
America’s image of veterans? Over 40 percent
of employers believe mental illness is a major
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impediment when hiring veterans.50 Is disability
now perceived as an inevitable consequence of
serving in the military?
• What is the extent of the impact, and how robust
across all levels of society are factors beyond VA
monetary compensation that incentivize veteran
disability? Interviewed soldiers described the
allure of incentives for disabled veterans, such
as free college tuition for dependents, property
tax relief, the waiving of substantial VA home
mortgage fees, and waived licensing fees.
The Army profession has an enduring responsibility
to care for its veterans. Disability compensation is an
essential part of that responsibility. The intent of this
study is not to prescribe the reduction or elimination
of disability compensation. America’s support for its
veterans must remain sacrosanct. Instead, we wish
to initiate a conversation from within the Army that
acknowledges the detrimental consequences of a
disability system that has overreached its intended
purposes. Our call for reform is driven not by fiscal
considerations, but by our desire for the Army to
remain both an esteemed institution trusted by
society and an honorable profession marked by
selfless service.

50. Society for Human Resource Management, “SHRM
Poll: Military Employment” (PowerPoint presentation, Society
for Human Resource Management, Alexandria, VA, February 20,
2012),  https://www.shrm.org/hr-todaytrends-and-forecasting
/research-and-surveys/Documents/SHRMPollMilitary%20
EmploymentFINAL.pptx.
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